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HOORAY(?) FOR THE MODEL ACT-THE 1969
REVISION AND THE CLOSE CORPORATION
ROBERT A. KESSLER*
I. INTRODUCTION
There are three preeminent corporate statutes in the United States. The
first is New York's, for that state has more corporations than any
other state.' The second is Delaware's, for that state is the home of
most of the large corporations. 2 And, the third is the Model Business
Corporation Act, for that statute has been enacted in so many of the
remaining jurisdictions.3
The draftsmen of the Model Act, the Committee on Corporate Laws
of the Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the Amer-
ican Bar Association, only take credit for adoption of their Act in twenty
states However, since it was first proposed in 1950,1 virtually every
state has either enacted a new corporation law or substantially revised
its existing one, and every one of these statutes has been influenced
by the Model Act. The extent of borrowing has differed from state to
state, but even the New York and Delaware statutes have been affected.'
* Professor of Law, Fordham University.
1. "From statistical studies prepared by Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., as of 1964, the figures
show that in number of businesses incorporated annually, the sixteen Model Act states ac-
counted for 40 thousand new incorporations or slightly more than one-fifth of the total
197 thousand, followed by New York with 36 thousand (about eighteen percent), and
California with 16 thousand (eight percent). Delaware was twelfth with 4 thousand (ap-
proximately two percent). The ratio has remained relatively constant through 1966 (see
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., Release of Feb. 15, 1967, Monthly New Incorporations, No. 1)!'
R. Baker & W. Cary, Cases and Materials on Corporations 3 (3d ed. Supp. 1968).
2. "Delaware became and remains the most popular state in which to incorporate any
interstate company of substantial size. To illustrate, of the approximately 1,250 corpora-
tions listed on the New York Stock Exchange on January 4, 1965, 433 or 3S percent were
Delaware corporations. New York was second with 164 or 13 percent; New Jersey had
seven percent and none of the rest had as much as 5 percent. (Seward, Basic Corporate
Practice (A.L.I-A.B.A. 1966), p. 5)." R. Baker & IV. Cary, supra note 1, at 2. See also
R. Stevens & H. Henn, Law of Corporations 26-28 (1965).
3. See note 1 supra.
4. "In the 19 years since the Model Business Corporation Act was reported by the
Committee on Corporate Laws to the Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law,
it has become a major point of reference in the continuing revision of state corporation
acts. It has been adopted in substance in 20 states and major portions have been followed
in many others." Preface to ABA-ALI Model Bus. Corp. Act at ii (rev. ed. 1969) [hereinafter
cited as Model Act].
5. Id. The Act was, however, originally drafted in 1946. Preface to 2 Model Bus. Corp.
Act Ann. at V (1960).
6. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law, Comments, §§ 102, 201-03, 301, 303, 402, 404, 501,
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It is fair to say, then, that if there is a typical American corporation
statute it is the Model Business Corporation Act.
In the nineteen years since it was first proposed, the Model Act has
been amended a number of times, and revised versions have been pub-
lished. The 1969 revision has recently been promulgated. The changes
embodied in this edition are, in the Committee's words, "the most
numerous and the most significant that have been made since its pub-
lication in 1950.")7
This new version of the Act, like the original version,' will undoubtedly
be the subject of extensive comment and analysis in the nation's law
reviews. The original Act was "liberal" or "enabling," and was, accord-
ingly, hailed by lawyers for large corporations, and condemned by those
concerned with "corporate democracy" and minority shareholders'
rights. Since the new Act is even more "liberal" and "enabling" than
the old one, corresponding praise and condemnation from the same
quarters can be anticipated as to the statute's "public issue" aspects.
Today, however, the emphasis has changed. Inevitably, state statutes
will become more "management oriented" in the probably vain attempt
to entice large and medium-sized corporations to abandon Delaware for
incorporation in equally or even more permissive jurisdictions. There-
fore, the stress is now on the new statutes' adequacy to meet the needs
of "close" corporations, i.e., those formed with a small amount of capital
by a few persons, usually friends or relatives, who regard themselves
as ''partners."
All recent corporation statutes have included some provisions designed
to favor such close corporations. A few, notably those of Florida,9 Mary-
land,10 and Delaware," recognize close corporations as a separate species,
and thus, have special sections explicitly applicable only to them.
The draftsmen of the new Model Act expressly rejected such special
statutory treatment. Instead, they preferred to leave to the close cor-
porate practitioner the task of choosing from among those provisions
503-11, 513, 516-17, 519, 604, 612, 628, 702, 704, 711-12, 719, 806, 902, 904-06, 909-10,
1006, 1116, 1301-02, 1306, 1312.
7. Model Act at iii.
8. See, e.g., Campbell, The Model Business Corporation Act, 11 Bus. Law. 98 (1956);
Emerson, Vital Weaknesses in the New Virginia Stock Corporation Law and the Model
Act, 42 Va. L. Rev. 489 (1956); Garrett, Model Business Corporation Act, 4 Baylor L.
Rev. 412 (1952); Garrett, History, Purpose and Summary of the Model Business Corpora-
tion Act, 6 Bus. Law. 1 (1950); Harris, The Model Business Corporation Act-Invitation
to Irresponsibility, 50 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1 (1955).
9. Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 608.0100-0107 (Supp. 1969).
10. Md. Ann. Code art. 23, §§ 100-11 (Supp. 1969).
11. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §§ 341-56 (Supp. 1968).
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1969 MODEL ACT REVISION
generally made available by the Act those best suited to his clients'
needs. 2 The Committee obviously felt that the devices proffered were
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the small incorporated business.
Its correctness in this conclusion is best assessed by comparing the close
corporation's needs with the new Act's statutory provisions designed to
meet them.
Although all close corporations do not have the same needs, it is rec-
ognized that most active participants in close corporations have certain
common desires. As a result, an evaluation of the Model Act in terms
of its treatment of such desires is justified.
The first desire is self-survival, i.e., control over the admission of new
participants. This is frequently called the principle of delectus person-
arum, keeping the close corporation close. The instrument for securing
this desideratum is, of course, the share transfer restriction.
In addition, although all participants may not want the same power
structure, they do all want the freedom to depart from the old share-
holder-director paradigm, whereby a plurality of the shares elect a com-
pletely autonomous, noncornmitted (i.e., not bound by any advance
agreement) board of at least three directors to whom all management
must be confided. In short, the second recognized desire is freedom to
mold the power structure.
Lastly, small businessmen cannot afford expensive legal talent to lead
them through organizational and operational labyrinths. Consequently,
simplicity as to both, or the avoidance of "red tape," is the participants'
third common desire.
Disputes in a close corporation are not only more acrimonious than
12. "The subject of close corporations calls for comment because of numerous sugges-
tions that special statutory treatment would be useful. This view has been considered by
the Committee over a period of years. Its conclusion Is that the Model Act provides the
flexibility required for ease of creation, management and administration of a close corpora-
tion without raising the problems that are generally posed by such a special statutory pro-
vision.
"For those interested in exploring the freedom of action permitted by the Model Act,
reference is particularly invited to Section 35 concerning management, Section 16 permitting
variations in series and restrictions on voting rights, Sections 32 and 143 with reference
to quorums of shareholders, Section 34 authorizing shareholder agreements, Sections 36 and
53 dealing with the number of directors and incorporators, and Section 37 concerning clas-
sification of directors, Section 40 as to quorum of directors, Section 54 authorizing restric-
tions on transferability of shares, and Sections 44 and 145 permitting action by directors
and shareholders without a meeting. Other sections add to the liberality afforded. The ex-
perienced practitioner is afforded a wide variety of devices for tailoring a close corporation
to his clients' needs." Model Act at iii-iv.
In contrast to the Florida, Maryland and Delaware statutes, the Model Act nowhere
uses the term "close corporation." (It does not even appear in the Index).
1970]
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in public issue corporations, they are also more apt to paralyze the busi-
ness to the detriment of all participants. The effectiveness of the Model
Act's provisions designed to assist small business, therefore, must also be
gauged in terms of the means provided to resolve such internecine dis-
putes.
There are always other provisions of a corporation statute of some
interest to close corporations. Although adjunctive to the sections relevant
to the enumerated desires, they are more conveniently treated under the
miscellaneous category which will form the last portion of this article.
II. KEEPING THE CORPORATION "CLOSE"
Most close corporations desire to impose "restrictions" on the trans-
ferability of their shares of stock. The reason, of course, is that such
stock carries with it an "intrusion power."' 3 Realistically, in a public
issue corporation forty shares out of several hundred thousand carry no
say in how the corporation will be operated. In a close corporation, how-
ever, the same number of shares may, even if perhaps only negatively,
determine how the business will be run. Moreover, stock ownership in
a close corporation is not only, and often not primarily, a right to share
in profits, but also a pledge of the owner's active participation in the
work of the business. Consequently, control over share transfers is, ob-
viously, necessary to prevent the intrusion of obfuscators (even the
widows of former owners often fall into that category) and to insure that
only active participants will be admitted into the corporation.
With the notable exception of Delaware's statute, most corporation
statutes (including New York's) are silent on the problem. Delaware,
however, has the most elaborate provisions in the country.14 Departing
13. The term "share restrictions" is today used in a broad sense to include binding
agreements to repurchase as well as mere limitations on free transferability. See, e.g., Del.
Code Ann. fit. 8, § 202 (Supp. 1968). Under this use of the term, "share restrictions" also
perform the function of insuring a fair return to a retiring member or the family of a
deceased participant. Even under the more limited use of the term, there are, of course,
other important functions which such restrictions can perform, such as maintaining the
proportionate interest of present members, avoiding termination of a Subchapter S tax
election, and possible loss of exemption under the Federal Securities Act of 1933. See Henn,
Book Review, 38 Fordham L. Rev. 146, 151 n.28 (1969). See also 2 F.H. O'Neal, Close
Corporations: Law and Practice § 7.03 (1958).
14. Del. Code Ann. fit. 8, § 202 (Supp. 1968) provides that:
"(a) A written restriction on the transfer or registration of transfer of a security of a
corporation, if permitted by this section and noted conspicuously on the security, may be
enforced against the holder of the restricted security or any successor or transferee of the
holder including an executor, administrator, trustee, guardian or other fiduciary entrusted
with like responsibility for the person or estate of the holder. Unless noted conspicuously
on the security, a restriction, even though permitted by this section, is ineffective except
against a person with actual knowledge of the restriction.
(b) A restriction on the transfer or registration of transfer of securities of a corporation
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from American tradition, it not only permits, but also requires close
corporations to impose some restrictions on share transfers. In addition,
it generally validates all "legal restrictions," and expressly validates
the commonly recognized first offer and buy-sell arrangements, the more
dubious consent agreements, and (unless "manifestly unreasonable")
the prohibited transferee plans. The new Model Act, carrying over the
earlier version of the Act,"0 contains none of these provisions. The Act
merely includes a general authorization for share restrictions. Section 54,
captioned "Articles of Incorporation," provides:
may be imposed either by the certificate of incorporation or by the by-laws or by an
agreement among any number of security holders or among such holders and the corpora-
tion. No restriction so imposed shall be binding with respect to securities issued prior to
the adoption of the restriction unless the holders of the securities are parties to an agree-
ment or voted in favor of the restriction.
(c) A restriction on the transfer of securities of a corporation is permitted by this sec-
tion if it:
(1) Obligates the holder of the restricted securities to offer to the corporation or to any
other holders of securities of the corporation or to any other person or to any combination
of the foregoing, a prior opportunity, to be exercised within a reasonable time, to acquire
the restricted securities; or
(2) Obligates the corporation or any holder of securities of the corporation or any other
person or any combination of the foregoing, to purchase the securities which are the subject
of an agreement respecting the purchase and sale of the restricted securities; or
(3) Requires the corporation or the holders of any class of securities of the corporation
to consent to any proposed transfer of the restricted securities or to approve the proposed
transferee of the restricted securities; or
(4) Prohibits the transfer of the restricted securities to designated persons or classes of
persons, and such designation is not manifestly unreasonable.
(d) Any restriction on the transfer of the shares of a corporation for the purpose of
maintaining its status as an electing small business corporation under subchapter S of the
United States Internal Revenue Code is conclusively presumed to be for a reasonable pur-
pose.
(e) Any other lawful restriction on transfer or registration of transfer of securities is
permitted by this section."
Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 342 (Supp. 1968) provides that:
"(a) A close corporation is a corporation organized under this chapter who-e certificate
of incorporation contains the provisions required by section 102 of this title and, in addi-
tion, provides that:
(1) All of the corporation's issued stock of all classes, exclusive of treasury shares, shall
be held of record by not more than a specified number of persons, not exceeding thirty;
and
(2) All of the issued stock of all classes shall be subject to one or more of the restrictions
on transfer permitted by section 202 of this title; and
(3) The corporation shall make no offering of any of its stock of any class which would
constitute a "public offering" within the meaning of the United States Securities Act of
1933, as it may be amended from time to time.
(b) The certificate of incorporation of a close corporation may set forth the qualifica-
tions of stockholders, either by specifying classes of persons who shall be entitled to be
holders of record of stock of any class, or by specifying classes of persons who shall not
be entitled to be holders of stock of any class or both.
(c) For purposes of determining the number of holders of record of the stock of a dose
corporation, stock which is held in joint or common tenancy or by the entireties shall be
treated as held by one stockholder."
See also N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14A:7-12 (1969).
15. ABA-ALI Model Bus. Corp. Act § 48(i) (1953) [hereinafter cited as Old Model
Act].
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The articles of incorporation shall set forth: ... (h) Any provision, not incon-
sistent with law, which the incorporators elect to set forth in the articles of incorpora-
tion for the regulation of the internal affairs of the corporation, including any provi-
sions restricting the transfer of shares and any provision which under the Act is
required or permitted to be set forth in the by-laws.
Although the clause as to share restrictions says "any provision," the
authorization is probably circumscribed by the general limitation, "not
inconsistent with law." If so, the statute's effect is to incorporate the
enacting state's common law as to permissible restrictions. Ordinarily,
this will mean the validation of first offer and buy-sell arrangements, and
the invalidation of the more stringent restrictions, such as consent and
prohibited transferee provisions. 6
While in most circumstances the permitted restrictions will be
sufficient for the needs of close corporations, the Act's general language
may well result in the hampering of legitimate close corporation ob-
jectives. This hampering is, in part, due to the carry-over of the Act's
companion filing provision with its "conformity to law" requirement.
New section 55, mirroring old section 49, only requires the secretary of
state to file the articles of incorporation if he finds that they "conform
to law." Some secretaries of state take such provisions as a legislative
directive that they scrutinize all provisions in the articles for possible
invalidity, and that they reject all documents which contain provisions
which are not clearly authorized. This requires them, in their view, to
sit simultaneously as court and prosecuting attorney against the lawyer
who has drafted the document. They view their filing of the articles as
somehow conferring the state's seal of approval on everything the articles
contain. With such a view of their role, these secretaries tend to be ex-
tremely conservative. Frequently, too, because of the press of their rou-
tine duties, they are even unaware of recent judicial decisions authorizing
provisions which to them seem "wrong." Since they know their power,
they can be quite intransigent. The lawyer's sole alternative is to use
only "standard" provisions, or mandamus the secretary with the possi-
bility of litigation to the highest state court, and the certainty of being
16. See H. Henn, Handbook of the Law of Corporations and Other Business Enterprises
430-38 (1961); 1 G. Hornstein, Corporation Law and Practice §§ 191-205 (1959, Supp.
1968); F.H. O'Neal, Close Corporations: Law and Practice §§ 7.01-.29 (1958, Supp.
1969); Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d 1318 (1958); Annot., 65 A.L.R. 1159 (1930).
Although the Act should not be narrowly interpreted, it could be argued that, under it,
share restrictions not contained in the articles (i.e., imposed by the bylaws or separate
agreement) are not valid. Patterns for improvement of the Model Act provision were
widely available, but, unfortunately, not utilized. See, e.g., R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 7.1-1.21-1
(Supp. 1969) which expressly allows the imposition of restrictions by bylaws or shareholder
agreement, as well as by a certificate of incorporation (articles) provision. Seo also Do].
Code Ann. tit. 8, § 342 (Supp. 1968) ; Md. Ann. Code art. 23, § 101 (Supp. 1969) requiting
share restrictions in close corporations; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14A:7-12 (1969).
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branded a "troublemaker," a reputation which will not help him in future
dealings with the department.
The choice is obvious, and results in the stifling of experimentation.
For example, it may well mean the yielding of restrictions designed to
protect a Subchapter S tax election, and those designed to debar transfer
to a competitor because they both qualify as "absolute prohibitions"
on transfer.
III. MOLDING THE POWER STRUCTURE
Although some very large corporations with widely dispersed share-
holdings have been aptly described as "self-perpetuating oligarchies,""
today's ideal corporation is still a plutocracy in which the people with
the greater financial stake dominate daily management, and, increasingly
(because of the widespread reduction to a mere majority in the number
of shareholder votes required to approve even fundamental changes)"8
the entire fate of the corporate venture. This majority plutocracy is not,
however, acceptable to most close corporations. Ordinarily, such cor-
porations want a form of "people power," in which brains are as im-
portant as money in running the corporation. But, sometimes, as in the
"one-man" corporation, what is wanted is an even more complete plutoc-
racy than the ordinary rules give, i.e., complete control by the real
investor even though others may have a nominal participation in the
enterprise.
In the past, corporation laws, at least as interpreted, have usually stood
in the way of such deviancies. Thus, attempts to give an individual voting
power disproportionate to his financial participation were frequently
struck down. The classic cases were Benintendi v. Kcnton Hotel, Inc.'0
and Jackson v. Hooper.0 The "one-man" corporation's desire to give
the dominant participant disproportionate control was also frustrated by
the requirements of a three-member board, and the frequent concomitant
statutory provision demanding that all directors be shareholders. -'
Starting with New York's 1948 amendment to section 9 of the old
Stock Corporation Law which permitted high vote and high quorum
17. A. Berle, Economic Power and the Free Society 10 (1957).
18. See, e.g., allowing merger on majority note: Fla. Stat. Ann. § 608.20(2) (1956);
Ind. Ann. Stat. § 25-231(b) (Supp. 1969); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 271.470(2) (1962); Me. Rev.
Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 243 (1964); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-10S(b) (1965); Okla. Stat. Ann.
fit. 18, § 1.66a(3) (1953); Pa. Stat. fit. 15, § 1902(C) (Supp. 1969); Utah Code Ann.
§ 16-10-68 (1953); Model Act § 73.
19. 294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E.2d 829 (1945).
20. 76 N.J. Eq. 592, 75 A. 568 (Ct. Err. & App. 1910). See also Nickolopoulos v. Saran-
tis, 102 N.. Eq. 585, 141 A. 792 (Ct. Err. & App. 1928) which held invalid an agreement
whereby a twenty-five percent shareholder was given a fifty percent vote as a shareholder
and director.
19701
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requirements for director and shareholder action, the obstacles to free
intra-corporate power allocation have, for the most part, been swept
away. Today, most states grant statutory permission for high vote and
quorum, thus allowing a minority holder to exercise a control greater
than his financial participation would otherwise permit.22
The "one-man" corporation is now widely allowed to dispense with
superfluous directors, and to confine complete control in the sole owner,
alternately wearing either his shareholder or director "hat."2 3 Where there
are other investors, however, full management control in the principal
participant has not been so widely recognized. 4
The Model Act was an early follower of the New York high vote
high quorum provision,2' and retained this permission in the new
version.26 Also carried over was the somewhat anomalous authorization
for high director vote and quorum, as well as high shareholder vote in
the bylaws, while restricting high shareholder quorum to the articles of
incorporation.
21. See, e.g., N.J. Gen. Corp. Law, Law of June 3, 1961, ch. 44, § 1, [1961) N.J. Acts
476; N.Y. Stock Corp. Law, Law of April 11, 1951, ch. 717, § 6, [1951] N.Y. Laws 166.
22. See 2 Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. § 136, at fI 2.01 (1960, Supp. 1966).
23. E.g., Arkansas (Ark. Stat. Ann. § 64-302 (1966)); Connecticut (Conn. Gen. Stat.
Ann. § 33-314(a) (Supp. 1969)); Delaware (Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(b) (Supp. 1968));
Illinois (Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 32, § 157.34 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969)); Minnesota (Minn.
Stat. Ann. § 301.28(1) (1969)) ; Nebraska (Neb. Rev. Stat. § 21-2036 (Supp. 1967)) ; Ne-
vada (Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 78.035(5), 78.115 (1967)); New York (N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law
§ 702(a) (Supp. 1969)); Oregon (Ore. Rev. Stat. § 57.185 (1965)); South Carolina (S.C.
Code Ann. § 12-18.3(a) (Supp. 1968)); Wyoming (Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 17-36.34 (1965)).
24. However, at least three states, Iowa, Kentucky and Missouri, anticipated that the
Model Act would permit less than three directors irrespective of the number of sharehold-
ers. See Iowa Code Ann. §§ 496A.34-.35 (1962); Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 271.035(1) (), 271.345
(1) (Supp. 1968); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 351.315(1) (1966).
25. See Old Model Act §§ 30, 37, 136.
26. Model Act § 143 provides that:
"Whenever, with respect to any action to be taken by the shareholders of a corporation,
the articles of incorporation require the vote or concurrence of the holders of a greater
proportion of the shares, or of any class or series thereof, than required by this Act with
respect to such action, the provisions of the articles of incorporation shall control."
Model Act § 32 provides that:
"Unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation, a majority of the shares en-
titled to vote, represented in person or by proxy, shall constitute a quorum at a meeting
of shareholders, but in no event shall a quorum consist of less than one-third of the shares
entitled to vote at the meeting. If a quorum is present, the affirmative vote of the majority
of the shares represented at the meeting and entitled to vote on the subject matter shall
be the act of the shareholders, unless the vote of a greater number or voting by classes is
required by this Act or the articles of incorporation or by-laws."
Model Act § 40 provides that:
"A majority of the number of directors fixed by or in the manner provided in the by-laws
or in the absence of a by-law fixing or providing for the number of directors, then of the
number stated in the articles of incorporation, shall constitute a quorum for the transaction
of business unless a greater number is required by the articles of incorporation or the by-
laws. The act of the majority of the directors present at a meeting at which a quorum is
present shall be the act of the board of directors, unless the act of a greater number Is re-
quired by the articles of incorporation or the by-laws."
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If the rationale is accepted that all significant management provisions
should be in the charter, because this is a public document that can
more fairly be held to give notice than the bylaws, then, consistent with
the New York pattern,27 all such provisions should be required to be
in the articles. Such a requirement, however, frequently poses a trap for
the clients of the unwary lawyer.2s The simpler procedure would be to
allow all such provisions in the bylaws,- or even a separate agreement,' "
but to deny the bylaw's or agreement's validity as to a non-consenting
shareholder without notice. Although a legend on share certificates
should not be required as a condition of validity,1 acceptance of share
certificates containing such a legend could conclusively be presumed to
be notice of and assent to such a bylaw or agreement provision.32
27. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 616 (as to high shareholder vote and quorum), § 709 (Supp.
1969) (as to high director vote and quorum), carrying over N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 9,
Law of April 11, 1951, ch. 717, § 1, [1951] N.Y. Laws 1665.
28. See, e.g., Model, Roland & Co. v. Industrial Acoustics Co., 16 N.Y.2d 703, 209 X.E.2d
553, 261 N.Y.S.2d 896 (1965); Matter of Faehndrich, 2 N.Y2d 468, 141 N.E.2d 597, 161
N.Y.S.2d 99 (1957); Fromkin v. Merrall Realty, Inc., 15 App. Div. 2d 919, 225 N.Y.S.2d
632 (2d Dep't 1962).
29. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 608.0105 (Supp. 1969) which provides:
"(1) The stockholders of a close corporation may enter into a written agreement, em-
bodied in the articles of incorporation or bylaws of the corporation, or in a side agreement
in writing and signed by all the parties thereto relating to any phase of the affairs of the
corporation, including, but not limited to, the following:
(a) Management of the business of the corporation.
(b) Declaration and payment of dividends or division of profits.
(c) Who shall be officers or directors, or both, of the corporation.
(d) Restrictions on transfer of stock.
(e) Voting requirements, including the requirements of unanimous voting of stockholders
or directors.
(f) Employment of stockholders by the corporation.
(g) Arbitration of issues as to which the stockholders are deadlocked in voting power or
as to which the directors are deadlocked and the stockholders are unable to break the
deadlock.
(2) No written agreement to which stockholders of a dose corporation have actually as-
sented, whether embodied in the charter or bylaws of the corporation or in any side agree-
ment in writing and signed by all the parties thereto, and which relates to any phase of
the affairs of the corporation, whether to the management of its business or division of its
profits or otherwise, shall be invalid as between the parties thereto, on the ground that it
is an attempt by the parties thereto to treat the corporation as if it were a partnership or
to arrange their relationships in a manner that would be appropriate only between partners.
(3) If the business of a close corporation is managed by a board of directors, an agree-
ment among all or less than all of the stockholders, whether solely among themselves or
between one or more of them and a party who is not a stockholder, is not invalid, as among
the parties thereto, on the ground that it so relates to the conduct of the affairs of the
corporation as to interfere with the discretion of the board of directors, but the making of
such an agreement shall impose upon the stockholders who are parties thereto the liability
for managerIal acts that is imposed by the laws of this state upon directors."
30. Id.
31. See Age Publishing Co. v. Becker, 110 Colo. 319, 134 P.2d 205 (1943); Kintzinger
v. Millin, 254 Iowa 173, 117 N...2d 68 (1962); Hopwood v. Topsham Tel. Co., 120 Vt.
97, 132 A.2d 170 (1957), holding invalid share restrictions not set forth on the certificates,
even as against persons with notice.
32. See, e.g., RI. Gen. Laws § 7.1-1.51 (1969) which provides that notice of dose cor-
poration provisions is conclusively presumed if under the corporation's name the corpora-
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Although the new Model Act does not, then, in this respect, represent
an advance over current law, it has made gains in another area. Specifi-
cally, the Act goes beyond the current less-than-three director statutes by
not limiting the paucity of directors to the number of shareholders. Model
Act section 36, departing from the old text, 3 provides that: "[t]he board
of directors of a corporation shall consist of one or more members."
The usual qualification that the number of directors shall in no event
be less than the number of shareholders has been omitted." Thus, pre-
sumably, a corporation with, for example, three shareholders can still
have a one director "board." Although perhaps dangerous in some close
corporations, 5 this permission should prove useful as part of a tax saving
device in a number of family corporations. It represents, therefore, a
valuable addition to corporate management flexibility.'"
An even more significant contribution to management flexibility is the
apparent statutory permission to dispense with the board entirely, should
the corporation desire to do so. Model Act section 35, radically changing
the corresponding provisions of the old Act, provides:
The business and affairs of a corporation shall be managed by a board of directors
except as may be otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation. If any such pro-
vision is made in the articles of incorporation, the powers and duties conferred or
imposed upon the board of directors by this Act shall be exercised or performed to
such extent and by such person or persons as shall be provided in the articles of in-
corporation.
Very few current corporation statutes go this far. With Model Act "ap-
proval," in the future, many more can be expected to follow suit.
tion's stock certificates state that it is a close corporation pursuant to the authorizing stat-
ute. See also Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 347(c) (Supp. 1968); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14A:5-21(6)
(1969).
33. Old Model Act § 34.
34. See Ark. Stat. Ann. § 64-302 (1966); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 33-314(a) (Supp.
1969) ; Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(b) (Supp. 1968) ; II. Ann. Stat. ch. 32, § 157.34 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1969); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 301.28(1) (1969); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 21-2036 (Supp.
1967); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 78.035(5), 78.115 (1967); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 702(a) (Supp.
1969); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 57.185 (1965); S.C. Code Ann. § 12-18.3(a) (Supp. 1968); Wyo.
Stat. Ann. § 17-36.34 (1965). As noted earlier, at least three states, Iowa, Kentucky, and
Missouri, anticipated that the Model Act would permit less than three directors regardless
of the number of shareholders. See Iowa Code Ann. §§ 496A.34-.35 (1962); Ky. Rev. Stat.
9§ 271.035(1)(i), 271.345(1) (Supp. 1968); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 351.315(1) (1966).
35. It would be dangerous to a minority shareholder to accept shares in a corporation
wherein a mere majority will elect the only director(s).
36. It would be useful to a father running a business. During his lifetime, he could issue
shares to members of his family, thus avoiding the death taxes which would be imposed
on gifts of the shares on his death, while, at the same time, retaining full control during
his life. Careful tax planning is, of course, necessary. See, e.g., Int. Rev. Code of 1954,
§§ 541-47.
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As writers have argued before,37 the board of directors is frequently
a superfluity for the close corporation. Management power can more
easily be allocated on the shareholder than the director level, since on
the shareholder level it can be proportioned by the simple device of
share issuance. Although less circumlocutive language (e.g., that a cor-
poration need not have a board if its articles so provided) 3 would have
been desirable, "the sentiment is there."
Such permitted deprivation of board power also assists the close cor-
poration practitioner in more easily accomplishing the power distribution
his client desires. It does this by transferring participant agreements
from the widely prohibited "director-impinging" category to the ordinarily
permitted shareholder classification.
Today, even in the absence of statute, shareholder "pooling" agree-
ments are normally regarded as valid, and enforceable. However, at com-
mon law, where such agreements bound their signatories as to voting in
their director capacity, they were normally invalid. 9 The new Model
Act (section 34) recognizes and reinforces the current rule:
Agreements among shareholders regarding the voting of their shares shall be valid
and enforceable in accordance with their terms. Such agreements shall not be subject
to the provisions of this section regarding voting trusts.
The last sentence is apparently designed to prevent the invalidation of
otherwise valid (i.e., non-director-sterilizing) shareholder-level agree-
ments. If, like Shakespeare's rose, they "smell" too much like voting
trusts, they have been held invalid in the past for failure to comply
with the filing, etc., requirements of the voting trust section. 0
If the only voting, then, is shareholder voting, a written side agree-
ment can effectively provide for all aspects of the corporation's operation.
In effect, a partnership can be created, with all the "partners" protected
by limited liability. This is probably what was intended, and is, there-
fore, a reason for commendation of the new Model Act. It should be
noted that, if this partnership corporation exists, it has been accomplished
without the complex provisions of other statutes which have attempted
to confer on small business a similar boon.' The Act's only deficiency
37. See, e.g., Kessler, The Statutory Requirement of a Board of Directors: A Corporate
Anachronism, 27 U. Chi. L. Rev. 697 (1960).
38. See, e.g., Md. Ann. Code art. 23, § 105(a) (Supp. 1969) which states that: "A close
corporation may, by its charter, provide that it will have no board of directors . .. ."
39. See, e.g., McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234 (1934); Manson v.
Curtis, 223 N.Y. 313, 119 N.E. 559 (1918). Model Act § 34, validating shareholders' agree-
ments "regarding the voting of their shares," pointedly omits permission for such agree-
ments to bind the signatories if voting as directors.
40. The leading case is Abercrombie v. Davies, 36 Del. Ch. 371, 130 A2d 338 (Sup. Ct.
1957).
41. See, e.g., the number of sections necessary to accomplish this purpose in the close
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is in not expressly validating such side agreements in those close cor-
porations which choose to retain the board.42
One carry-over by the Act (section 50 repeats old section 4 4 )41 of an
obstacle to flexible power allocation should also be noted. Section 50
seems clearly to require at least two persons to act as officers. Ironically
then, although a one-man corporation need have only one director, or
none, it must still have two officers. They may presumably be denied all
express authority. However, even though the danger is limited, the
dummy officer may cause problems because of his possible implied or
apparent authority to bind the corporation.44
IV. No "RED TAPE"
"Red tape" is generally anathema to close corporation participants.
At least with respect to the organizational process, it is also anathema
to attorneys for such corporations, since they are frequently general
practitioners rather than corporate specialists, and, therefore, apt to be
trapped by ignored technical requirements.
The old Model Act's provision for reservation of a corporate name,
widely enacted even by states which did not otherwise closely follow
the Act,4" was, of course, a great help. Before the provision was passed,
the small practitioner without personal influence in the department of
corporation portion of the Delaware statute. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §§ 342-44, 350-51, 354
(Supp. 1968).
42. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 608.0103-.0105 (Supp. 1969) which expressly authorizes
such "side agreements." See also S.C. Code Ann. § 12-16.22 (Supp. 1968) which allows
such management agreements, but requires at least a reference to them in the articles of
incorporation and share certificates.
43. Model Act § 50 provides that:
"The officers of a corporation shall consist of a president, one or more vice presidents as
may be prescribed by the bylaws, a secretary, and a treasurer, each of whom shall be
elected by the board of directors at such time and in such manner as may be prescribed
by the by-laws. Such other officers and assistant officers and agents as may be deemed
necessary may be elected or appointed by the board of directors or chosen in such other
manner as may be prescribed by the by-laws. Any two or more offices may be held by
the same person, except the offices of president and secretary."
44. Another useful provision is found in Model Act § 33. It states that:
"Each outstanding share, regardless of class, shall be entitled to one vote on each matter
submitted to a vote at a meeting of shareholders, except as may be otherwise provided in
the articles of incorporation. If the articles of incorporation provide for more or less than
one vote for any share, in any matter, every reference in this Act to a majority or other
proportion of shares shall refer to such a majority or other proportion of votes entitled
to be cast."
Although different voting rights for otherwise identical shares will disqualify the cor-
poration for Subchapter S tax treatment (Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(g), TI). 6904, 1967-1
Cum. Bull. 219) such voting rights could be used to accomplish the disproportionate power
structure on the shareholder level which the participants desired in Nicholopoulos v. Sarantis,
102 N.J. Eq. 585, 141 A. 792 (Ct. Err. & App. 1928).
45. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 608.031 (Supp. 1969) ; Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 156B, § 11(c)-
(d) (1970); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 303 (1963).
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state might well find that, although initially accepted, the corporate name
he reserved had been preempted in the interim between clearance and
receipt of the typed articles at the department. Statutorily recognized
name reservation, as permitted by old section 8, did away with both the
extra work of retyping and resubmitting new papers with a new, non-
conflicting name, and the possible embarrassment of having to poll the
clients on a substitute for the one originally chosen. It was, of course,
reenacted in new Model Act section 9.
An old chore, looking up purpose clauses in form books, has wisely
been eliminated in the new Act. The "all purpose" clause is now permit-
ted.4" No longer, therefore, does a lawyer for a drug store need to spe-
cifically set forth as the corporate purposes a long list of activities ranging
from the sale of snuff to the "manufacture" of pharmaceuticals and the
operation of a restaurant to protect his clients from the possible charge
of ultra vires. When old section 6,'1 emasculating the ultra vires defense,
was widely enacted, the policy decision against limiting corporate activi-
ties to those enumerated was, in effect, already made. It only remained
to remove the last vestige of the philosophy of fear of corporateness" by
omitting the requirement of verbal commitment in the charter.
46. Model Act § 54 provides that:
"The articles of incorporation shall set forth:
(c) The purpose or purposes for which the corporation is organized which may be stated
to be, or to include, the transaction of any or all lawful business for which corporations
may be incorporated under this Act."
47. The section was carried over (with minor stylistic changes in paragraph (a)) in
Model Act § 7 which provides that:
"No act of a corporation and no conveyance or transfer of real or personal property to
or by a corporation shall be invalid by reason of the fact that the corporation was without
capacity or power to do such act or to make or receive such conveyance or transfer, but
such lack of capacity or power may be asserted:
(a) In a proceeding by a shareholder against the corporation to enjoin the doing of any
act or the transfer of real or personal property by or to the corporation. If the unauthorized
act or transfer sought to be enjoined is being, or is to be, performed or made pursuant to
a contract to which the corporation is a party, the court may, if all of the parties to the
contract are parties to the proceeding and if it deems the same to be equitable, set aside
and enjoin the performance of such contract, and in so doing may allow to the corporation
or to the other parties to the contract, as the case may be, compensation for the loss or
damage sustained by either of them which may result from the action of the court in set-
ting aside and enjoining the performance of such contract, but anticipated profits to be
derived from the performance of the contract shall not be awarded by the court as a loss
or damage sustained.
(b) In a proceeding by the corporation, whether acting directly or through a receiver,
trustee, or other legal representative, or through shareholders in a representative suit,
against the incumbent or former officers or directors of the corporation.
(c) In a proceeding by the Attorney General, as provided in this Act, to dissolve the
corporation, or in a proceeding by the Attorney General to enjoin the corporation from
the transaction of unauthorized business."
48. Limitations on permitted activities and the strict ultra vires rule were both facets
of a repressive attitude toward corporations which characterized their early history in this
country. This attitude was inspired by the fear of such bodies as the arms of what was
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A desirable by-product of the new provisions is the probable saving of
tax money which will result from diminishing the number of bureaucrats
required to screen incorporation papers prior to official filing. There is
also no real concomitant danger in permitting the clause, since, obviously,
the articles' filing will neither legalize an otherwise criminal activity (e.g.,
gambling) nor, for that matter, legalize any other activity prohibited
to business corporations. In addition, although the articles' form (old
section 48) was already simple, with the new all-purpose clause, it will
be even simpler.49
Simplicity of formation is also aided by the carry-over of the provi-
sion requiring only a single incorporator (old section 47, new section 53).
Single filing, (old section 49, new section 55) "which is conclusive evi-
dence" of due incorporation against all but the state in a direct action
(old section 50, new section 56), is of valuable assistance because it
means that once the lawyer receives the certificate that his corporation's
articles are filed he can forget about de facto problems. 0
regarded as a repressive English government. See R. Baker & V. Cary, Cases and Materials
on Corporations 4-8 (3d ed. unabr. 1958).
49. Model Act § 54 provides that:
"The articles of incorporation shall set forth:
(a) The name of the corporation.
(b) The period of duration, which may be perpetual.
(c) The purpose or purposes for which the corporation is organized which may be stated
to be, or to include, the transaction of any or all lawful business for which corporations
may be incorporated under this Act.
(d) The aggregate number of shares which the corporation shall have authority to issue;
if such shares are to consist of one class only, the par value of each of such shares, or a
statement that all of such shares are without par value; or, if such shares are to be divided
into classes, the number of shares of each class, and a statement of the par value of the
shares of each such class or that such shares are to be without par value.
(e) If the shares are to be divided into classes, the designation of each class and a state-
ment of the preferences, limitations and relative rights in respect of the shares of each
class.
(f) If the corporation is to issue the shares of any preferred or special class in series,
then the designation of each series and a statement of the variations in the relative rights
and preferences as between series insofar as the same are to be fixed in the articles of in-
corporation, and a statement of any authority to be vested in the board of directors to
establish series and fix and determine the variations in the relative rights and preferences
as between series.
(g) If any preemptive right is to be granted to shareholders, the provisions therefor.
(h) Any provision, not inconsistent with law, which the incorporators elect to set forth
in the articles of incorporation for the regulation of the internal affairs of the corporation,
including any provision restricting the transfer of shares and any provision which under
this Act is required or permitted to be set forth in the by-laws.
(i) The address of its initial registered office, and the name of its initial registered agent
at such address.
(j) The number of directors constituting the initial board of directors and the names
and addresses of the persons who are to serve as directors until the first annual meeting
of shareholders or until their successors be elected and qualify.
(k) The name and address of each incorporator.
It shall not be necessary to set forth in the articles of incorporation any of the corporate
powers enumerated in this Act."
S0. See Robertson v. Levy, 197 A.2d 443 (D.C. Ct. App. 1964), which held specifically
that the managers were individually liable under old Model Act § 139 (new Model Act
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The "organization" of the corporation, principally the enactment of
bylaws and the election of officers, can conceptually be allocated to the
shareholders (for whom the incorporator is surrogate) or the directors."1
The Model Act, perhaps to be consistent with its provisions that bylaws
are the ordinary province of the directors (old section 5, new section
27),52 requires that the directors complete the organization process. This,
of course, necessitates that there be an initial director or directors to
act. The Act, to insure that they are available to do this paper work,
demands that the initial directors be named in the articles of incor-
poration. 5 This choice seems unwise. It is one of the facts of corporate
life that incorporators and initial directors are "dummies": the lawyer
himself, or, where more than one person is needed, also his employees,
or someone from down the hall. There is, of course, nothing to prevent
the sole incorporator from also being sole, initial director. It does, how-
ever, mean repeating the name twice, an unnecessary technicality since
the whole business is a fiction. In addition, it means that careful prac-
titioners must undergo the ritual of having the initial director resign
and elect his successor, a real director, after enactment of the bylaws
and election of officers. This resignation will be a practical necessity if
any other (real) business is to be transacted, e.g., the authorization of
the issuance of shares, especially where they are in exchange for property
§ 146) for obligations incurred prior to the filing of the articles, but added that filing
provided a cutoff date, thus, eliminating the necessity for de facto corporations and cor-
porations by estoppel. Accordingly, there cannot be any individual liability as a result of
defective organization unless the liability is incurred prior to filing. As to Innocent nonfil-
ing, the Robertson rule seems too harsh. See, e.g., Cranson v. International Business Mach.
Corp., 234 Md. 477, 200 A.2d 33 (1964), where the court held the individual not liable
when the nonfiling was due to the attorney's negligence, and the dealings were on a cor-
porate basis. The Maryland statute does not contain a counterpart to Model Act § 146
(old Model Act § 139). Denial of a corporation's existence by estoppel, under such circum-
stances, would not seem mandated by the Model Act provision.
The possibility of analogous statutory liability for commencing business before the min-
imum paid-in capital requirements have been met (see old Model Act §§ 51, 43(e)) has
wisely been eliminated from the new Act. A requirement of only $1,000 in the "till" gives
such scant protection to creditors that it qualifies as mere "red tape," and, accordingly,
its omission is a reason for commendation of the new Act.
51. The acceptance of share subscriptions also can be conceptually allocated to the share-
holders or directors.
52. Most close corporations will not want the directors to have the power to amend the
bylaws. Such corporations will prefer to give it to the shareholders. This will, under the
Model Act § 27, require a specific provision in the articles. Since silence ill confer power
on the directors, the New York form (N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 601(a) (1963)), which rep-
resents the traditional position, is preferable. It leaves in the shareholders the power to
enact bylaws unless the power is conferred upon the board by the certificate of incorpora-
tion or a shareholder bylaw provision.
53. Model Act § 54().
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which must be evaluated.5 It would have been much simpler, therefore,
to confine organization to the incorporator who could then elect a real
participant as director. 55
It is no longer necessary to worry about whether or not the signed
minutes of a shareholder or director meeting will suffice even though no
actual meeting has been held. The old Model Act allowed unanimous sep-
arate shareholder consent to substitute for an actual meeting (old section
138). This provision has, of course, been retained in the new Act (new
section 145). Although the original Act did not include it, in 1966 an
optional provision (Optional section 39A) was added to authorize direc-
tors also to take action without a meeting where all had signed a written
consent "before such action." This provision has now been made a reg-
ular part of the Act (section 44).11
Obviously, such provisions help with the incorporation paperwork,
since the attorney, acting as initial director, can sign the prefabricated
record of the "action" to be taken at the organization "meeting." Fur-
thermore, the provision will be of even greater utility when the corpora-
tion is actually in operation, for the real participants can then forgo
actual meetings as long as they memorialize their separately agreed deci-
sion in a signed record.
One problem with the original provision was that it expressly autho-
rized only an advance consent and not one taken after the action. 7 This
could conceivably (on the well-recognized principle of construction of
legislative intent, expressio unius est exclusio alterius) have been inter-
preted as denying validity to a written consent given after the action had
occurred. New section 44 omits the requirement that the consent be
signed "before such action," and substitutes the words "action so taken"
54. The dummy director will not want to risk possible liability for significant decisions.
See 47 Cornell L.Q. 443 (1962).
55. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 404 (1963).
56. Model Act § 44 provides that:
"Unless otherwise provided by the articles of incorporation or by-laws, any action required
by this Act to be taken at a meeting of the directors of a corporation, or any action which
may be taken at a meeting of the directors or of a committee, may be taken without a
meeting if a consent in writing, setting forth the action so taken, shall be signed by all of
the directors, or all of the members of the committee, as the case may be. Such consent
shall have the same effect as a unanimous vote."
More than half of the states allow informal action by the directors. See 1 Model Bus.
Corp. Act Ann. § 39A, at f1 2.02 (Supp. 1966).
57. Old Model Act Optional § 39A provided:
"Unless otherwise provided by the articles of incorporation or by-laws, any action re-
quired by this Act to be taken at a meeting of the directors of a corporation, or any ac-
without a meeting if a consent in writing, setting forth the action so to be taken, shall be
tion which may be taken at a meeting of the directors or of a committee, may be taken
signed before such action by all of the directors, or all of the members of the committee,
as the case may be. Such consent shall have the same effect as a unanimous vote."
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for old section 39A's language, action "to be taken." A consent after the
action is now clearly permitted. Presumably, "action" is broad enough
to include a decision to take action. It would certainly be strange if the
prudent were penalized. Ironically, however, there is presently at least a
scintilla of uncertainty as to the validity of advance consent. Perhaps,
each director can sign a separate paper setting forth the agreed action.
However, the use of the singular, "consent," might suggest that all had
to sign the same paper. In any event, the language could easily have been
corrected to avoid these uncertainties. 8
Another problem raised by statutory authorizations for written consent
in lieu of a director's meeting also deserves mention. In the past, despite
the general rule that absent a meeting, separate individual director con-
sent, even if in writing, was ineffectual 9 courts engrafted estoppel excep-
tions, even approving separate oral consent,00 sometimes by less than
all,6 ' to uphold informally sanctioned transactions. The Act's express
validation of only separate written consent might be interpreted as over-
ruling these case law ameliorations of the stringent rule that directors
must act at a regular meeting. Sometimes silence is better than not saying
enough. Hopefully, however, this provision, obviously designed to be
helpful and not a trap, will not be given such a restrictive interpretation.'
58. See N.J. Stat. Ann. 14A:6-7(2) (1969) which states that:
"Unless otherwise provided by the certificate of incorporation or by-laws, any action re-
quired or permitted to be taken pursuant to authorization voted at a meeting of the board
or any committee thereof, may be taken without a meeting if, prior or subsequent to such
action, all members of the board or of such committee, as the case may be, consent thereto
in writing and such written consents are filed with the minutes of the proceedings of the
board or committee. Such consent shall have the same effect as a unanimous vote of the
board or committee for all purposes, and may be stated as such in any certificate or other
document filed with the Secretary of State."
See also Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 33-316(d) (Supp. 1969); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§ 450.13(4) (c) (1967); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 351.340 (1965). They also expressly approve
separate written consents.
59. See Baldwin v. Canfield, 26 Minn. 43, 1 N.W. 261 (1879). See also H. Henn, supra
note 16, at 339.
60. See, e.g., Simonson v. Helburn, 198 Misc. 430, 97 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. CL 1950);
Gerard v. Empire Square Realty Co., 195 App. Div. 244, 187 N.Y.S. 306 (2d Dep't 1921).
61. See Sherman v. Fitch, 98 Mass. 59 (1867); R. Baker & W. Cary, supra note 48,
at 119-20.
62. The Model Act could easily have gone further. See, e.g., RJ. Gen. Laws § 7-1-1.39
(1969) which provides that, if authorized by the bylaws, meetings may be held by means
of telephone conference circuit, and connection to such circuit constitutes presence at such
a meeting. See also its predecessor, Pa. Stat. tit. 15, § 1008 (Supp. 1969); Kessler, supra
note 37, at 718. Since both the North Carolina (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-29(a)(3) (1965))
and South Carolina (S.C. Code Ann. § 12-18.12 (Supp. 1968)) statutes generally rec-
ognize informal director action even though not pursuant to a written consent which is
approved by the shareholders, they are advances over the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania
statutes, and, undoubtedly, are improvements over the Model Act section.
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V. RESOLVING DisPuTEs
In a public issue corporation, although there may be some dissenters,
and, perhaps, even a few "demonstrators," disputes are usually peace-
fully resolved by the vote of the "silent majority" of proxies. In a close
corporation, however, disputes frequently rise to the "confrontation"
level of tension. Obviously, some methods for resolving these disputes
must be available. The standard ones are arbitration, buy-out, and, if all
else fails, dissolution. Despite the fact that buy-out arrangements,
whereby one side in a dispute forces the other to buy it out, or sell out to
it, are presumably permissible because they involve share restrictions,
the only leading method that the Model Act has expressly sanctioned
is dissolution. 3
While arbitration of disputes on the shareholder level may well be
possible under the general permission for shareholder agreements, °
disputes among the participants in their director capacities, e.g., as to the
election and removal of officers, and the day-to-day management of the
corporation, would seem interdicted. This is true even where the state's
arbitration statute is broad enough to include such disputes under the
general rule which forbids outside interference with the powers confided
by law to the board. 5 A temporary delegation of director powers to arbi-
trators may be possible under a clause in the articles of incorporation
permitting such a delegation. However, because the statute does not
expressly authorize it, conservative secretaries of state may reject
charters containing such arbitration provisions as not being "conformable
to law." The Model Act's silence is in sharp contrast with at least one
other statute, that of Florida, which not only permits arbitration, but also
makes dissolution contingent upon its failure. 7
63. Where the intramural conflict results in financial detriment to the corporation, fre-
quently, receivership will also be available. See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. 14A:14-2(2)(c) (1969)
which allows an action for receivership by a shareholder owning at least ten percent of
the outstanding shares of any class on the ground that: "the business of the corporation
is being conducted at a great loss and greatly prejudicial to the interests of its creditors
or shareholders."
Other remedies are available in a few jurisdictions. See, e.g., Cal. Corp. Code § 819
(Supp. 1970); Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §§ 352, 353 (Supp. 1968); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 351.320
(1966) allowing the court to appoint a provisional director to break a deadlock; Del. Code
Ann. tit. 8, § 352 (Supp. 1968) allowing appointment of a "custodian" If the shareholders
or directors are deadlocked, or in lieu of dissolution under a certificate provision.
64. Model Act § 34.
65. See Hornstein, Stockholders' Agreements in The Closely Held Corporation, 59 Yale
L.J. 1040 (1950); O'Neal, Resolving Disputes in Closely Held Corporations: Intra-Institu-
tional Arbitration, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 786 (1954); Note, Arbitration as a Means of Settling
Disputes within Close Corporations, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 267 (1963); Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d
643 (1959).
66. Model Act § 35.
67. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 608.0107 (Supp. 1969) provides that:
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With regard to dissolution, the new Model Act in sections 8318 and
8469 incorporates both old section 76, which allows all the shareholders,
by written consent, to dissolve the corporation, and old section 77,
"The circuit court, sitting in chancery, may entertain a petition of any stockholder for
involuntary dissolution of any close corporation and, at the hearing, may appoint a re-
ceiver or trustee of the corporation and order it dissolved, pursuant to the procedure
provided in § 60829, when it is made to appear:
1. That the directors of the corporation are deadlocked in the management of the cor-
porate affairs and the stockholders are unable to break the deadlock, or
2. That the stockholders are deadlocked in voting power; and
3. Arbitration or any other remedy provided in any written agreement of the stock-
holders upon deadlock of the directors or stockholders has failed."
The Model Act § 4 even omits the possibly helpful corporate power to participate in
arbitrative proceedings. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 202(a)(2) (1963).
68. Model Act § 83 provides:
"A corporation may be voluntarily dissolved by the written consent of all of its share-
holders.
Upon the execution of such written consent, a statement of intent to dissolve shall be
executed in duplicate by the corporation by its president or a vice president and by its
secretary or an assistant secretary, and verified by one of the officers signing such statement,
which statement shall set forth:
(a) The name of the corporation.
(b) The names and respective addresses of its officers.
(c) The names and respective addresses of its directors.
(d) A copy of the written consent signed by all shareholders of the corporation.
(e) A statement that such written consent has been signed by all shareholders of the
corporation or signed in their names by their attorneys thereunto duly authorizedY
69. Model Act § 84 provides:
"A corporation may be dissolved by the act of the corporation, when authorized in the
following manner:
(a) The board of directors shall adopt a resolution recommending that the corporation
be dissolved, and directing that the question of such dissolution be submitted to a vote at
a meeting of shareholders, which may be either an annual or a special meeting.
(b) Written notice shall be given to each shareholder of record entitled to vote at such
meeting within the time and in the manner provided in this Act for the giving of notice
of meetings of shareholders, and, whether the meeting be an annual or spcial meeting,
shall state that the purpose, or one of the purposes, of such meeting is to consider the ad-
visability of dissolving the corporation.
(c) At such meeting a vote of shareholders entitled to vote thereat shall be taken on a
resolution to dissolve the corporation. Such resolution shall be adopted upon receiving the
affirmative vote of the holders of a majority of the shares of the corporation entitled to
vote thereon, unless any class of shares is entitled to vote thereon as a class, in which event
the resolution shall be adopted upon receiving the affirmative vote of the holders of a ma-
jority of the shares of each class of shares entitled to vote thereon as a class and of the
total shares entitled to vote thereon.
(d) Upon the adoption of such resolution, a statement of intent to dissolve shall be ex-
ecuted in duplicate by the corporation by its president or a vice president and by its sec-
retary or an assistant secretary, and verified by one of the officers signing such statement,
which statement shall set forth:
(1) The name of the corporation.(2) The names and respective addresses of its officers.
(3) The names and respective addresses of its directors.
(4) A copy of the resolution adopted by the shareholders authorizing the dissolution of
the corporation.
(5) The number of shares outstanding, and, if the shares of any class are entitled to
vote as a class, the designation and number of outstanding shares of each such class.
(6) The number of shares voted for and against the resolution, respectively, and, if the
shares of any class are entitled to vote as a class, the number of shares of each such class
voted for and against the resolution, respectively."
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which provides, with minor changes (including reduction of the required
shareholder vote from two-thirds to a majority) for dissolution upon the
directors' recommendation and shareholders' approval at a meeting. Obvi-
ously, section 83 is only of use in a conflict situation where, despite their
disagreements, the shareholders are all able to agree on this one crucial
matter, an unlikely occurrence. In a close corporation, most significant
decisions will ordinarily be subject to a minority veto (by use of a high
vote requirement on director and/or shareholder levels) .70 Accordingly,
section 84 will usually not be available as a device for breaking a dead-
lock, and, in fact, may be subject to one.
Since the Model Act, unlike a number of recent statutes,7 1 does not
authorize a provision in the articles whereby the participants can provide
in advance for the circumstances under which a participant can auto-
matically dissolve the corporation, principal reliance under the Act will
have to be placed on judicial dissolution. Section 97 of the Model Act
reenacts old section 90. If a shareholder sues, it allows, but does not
mandate, judicial "liquidation of the assets and business of a corpora-
tion," on any one of four grounds:
(1) That the directors are deadlocked in the management of the corporate affairs and
the shareholders are unable to break the deadlock, and that irreparable injury to the
corporation is being suffered or is threatened by reason thereof; or
(2) That the acts of the directors or those in control of the corporation are illegal,
oppressive or fraudulent; or
(3) That the shareholders are deadlocked in voting power, and have failed, for a
period which includes at least two consecutive annual meeting dates, to elect suc-
cessors to directors whose terms have expired or would have expired upon the election
of their successors; or
(4) That the corporate assets are being misapplied or wasted.
Obviously, the availability of the fourth ground in an intra-corporate
conflict situation will be limited. The utility of ground two will depend
on how far the courts stretch the meaning of "illegal, oppressive or fraud-
ulent." Not only is the first ground dependent on a showing of "irrepa-
rably injury," but, although obviously designed for close corporations, it
is only usable by shareholders in those corporations which have a veto
requirement for director action or an even number of directors. 2 The
third ground is certain, but, of course, requires a two year waitY'
70. Model Act §§ 32, 40.
71. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 355 (Supp. 1968); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14A:12-5
(1969); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1002 (1963); S.C. Code Ann. § 12-22.14 (Supp. 1969).
72. Under Model Act § 39, if the directors are removable by a majority of the share-
holders, dissolution will not be available since the deadlock can be broken.
73. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 156B, § 99 (1970) no longer requires the two year wait for
a petition on this ground. It should be noted that permission to file a petition for dLssolu-
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The explicit means offered by the new Model Act for the resolution of
intra-corporate disputes in the close corporations are the same as those
offered by the old Act, and, accordingly, lag behind more modem develop-
ments in other statutes.
VI. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
Section 38 of the 1969 Act repeats old section 36, which provides for
the filling of director vacancies by a majority of the remaining directors.
The only deficiency here is that the statute does not allow the articles to
provide otherwise. The result may be a control shift, disastrous to a
carefully planned close corporate set-up.74 The only secure protection
would seem to be to abolish the board.
Unlike a number of other recent statutes, 6 the Model Act contains no
express authorization for election of officers by the shareholders rather
than the board.76 Under the Act officers are also only removable by the
board. 7 Presumably, if the articles contain a provision confiding these
aspects of director power to the shareholders, they will prevail. However,
the new Act's language might have been explicit."' Although unlikely, it
tion is not a guarantee that dissolution will be granted. The classic example is In re Radom
& Neidorff, Inc., 307 N.Y. 1, 119 N.E.2d 563 (1954).
74. See, e.g., Gearing v. Kelly, 11 N.Y.2d 201, 182 N.E.2d 391, 227 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1962),
af'g 15 App. Div. -2d 219, 222 N.Y.S.2d 474 (Ist Dep't), rev'g 29 Misc. 2d 674, 215 N.Y.S.2d
609 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Avien, Inc. v. Weiss, 50 Misc. 2d 127, 269 N.YS.2d 836 (Sup. Ct.
1966), in which the flling of board vacancies by the remaining directors resulted in the
complete domination by one faction to the exclusion ("freeze out") of the other.
75. Even in 1958, approximately one-quarter of the American states allowed the share-
holders to select officers. R. Baker & W. Cary, supra note 48, at 282. See also 2 Model Bus.
Corp. Act Ann. § 44, at ff 2.02 (1960, Supp. 1966).
76. Model Act § 50 provides that:
"The officers of a corporation shall consist of a president, one or more vice presidents as
may be prescribed by the by-laws, a secretary, and a treasurer, each of whom shall be
elected by the board of directors at such time and in such manner as may be prescribed
by the by-laws. Such other officers and assistant officers and agents as may be deemed
necessary may be elected or appointed by the board of directors or chosen in such other
manner as may be prescribed by the by-laws. Any two or more offices may be held by
the same person, except the offices of president and secretary.
All officers and agents of the corporation, as between themselves and the corporation,
shall have such authority and perform such duties in the management of the corporation
as may be provided in the by-laws, or as may be determined by resolution of the board
of directors not inconsistent with the by-laws."
77. Model Act § 51 provides that:
"Any officer or agent may be removed by the board of directors whenever in its judgment
the best interests of the corporation will be served thereby, but such removal shall be
without prejudice to the contract rights, if any, of the person so removed. Election or
appointment of an officer or agent shall not of itself create contract rights."
78. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 715(b) (1963): "The certificate of incorporation may
provide that all officers or that specified officers shall be elected by the shareholders instead
of by the board.' The even simpler New Jersey provision, coupled with deletion of the
words "by the board of directors" and "in its judgment" from the Model Act (Model Act
§ 50), could also easily have been used to accommodate the close corporation's needs. N.J.
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is always possible that the election and removal of officers will not be
considered a management function, and hence, not delegable. If so, such
election and removal will remain a director function, and typical share-
holder agreements which provide for election of named signatories as
officers may well be invalid.79 This, of course, is no help to the close
corporation. If the Committee wanted to insure the validity of such agree-
ments, as it probably did, it should have made it clear that a corporation
could provide for shareholder election and removal of officers through a
charter or bylaw provision. This would have "downgraded" such other-
wise director-impinging contracts to the shareholder level, where, under
section 34,80 they would have been clearly valid.
Another matter deserves mention. Preemptive rights, or the privilege
of preserving one's power-financial participation in a corporation when
new shares are issued, are valuable to close corporation participants.
They are, of course, not a guarantee against a freeze-out; 1 but a freeze-
out of a minority holder through issuance of new shares is much easier
without them.
The Model Act has two alternative provisions with regard to preemp-
tive rights, and so like a Chinese menu, a state can choose one from
column A or one from column B. Unless the charter provides otherwise,
the first, section 26, denies preemptive rights completely,8 2 while the sec-
ond, section 26A, with exceptions, grants them. 3
Stat. Ann. § 14A:6-15(1) (1969). The New Jersey statute states that: "Unless otherwise
provided in the by-laws, the officers shall be elected or appointed by the board."
79. The leading case is McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234 (1934).
80. See text accompanying notes 39-40 supra.
81. See, e.g., Hyman v. Velsicol Corp., 342 Ill. App. 489, 97 N.E.2d 122 (1951).
82. Model Act § 26 provides that:
"The shareholders of a corporation shall have no preemptive right to acquire unissued or
treasury shares of the corporation, or securities of the corporation convertible into or carry-
ing a right to subscribe to or acquire shares, except to the extent, if any, that such right
is provided in the articles of incorporation."
83. Model Act § 26A provides that:
"Except to the extent limited or denied by this section or by the articles of incorporation,
shareholders shall have a preemptive right to acquire unissued or treasury shares or secu-
rities convertible into such shares or carrying a right to subscribe to or acquire shares.
Unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation,
(a) No preemptive right shall exist:
(1) to acquire any shares issued to directors, officers or employees pursuant to approval
by the affirmative vote of the holders of a majority of the shares entitled to vote thereon
or when authorized by and consistent with a plan theretofore approved by such a vote of
shareholders; or
(2) to acquire any shares sold otherwise than for cash.(b) Holders of shares of any class that is preferred or limited as to dividends or assets
shall not be entitled to any preemptive right.
(c) Holders of shares of common stock shall not be entitled to any preemptive right to
shares of any class that is preferred or limited as to dividends or assets or to any obliga-
tions, unless convertible into shares of common stock or carrying a right to subscribe to or
acquire shares of common stock.(d) Holders of common stock without voting power shall have no preemptive right to
shares of common stock with voting power.
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Public issue corporations, with good reason, do not like preemptive
rights, because they obligate the corporation to solicit, perhaps, many
thousands of shareholders before a new offering to the public can be
made. In the public issue corporation's case, therefore, the granting of
preemptive rights seems completely unnecessary, since any present share-
holders can always preserve their proportionate participation by the
simple expedient of buying the new shares on the open securities markets.
To make it easier for public issue corporations, most states will probably
enact section 26 rather than section 26A. This is not fatal to close corpo-
rations. It means, however, that the less sophisticated close corporation
lawyer must remember to make the necessary addition to the charter so
that the preemptive rights will be granted.
A rather dangerous provision (old section 71)84 has remained substan-
tially intact in the new Act (section 78),81 and may pose dangers to close
corporations. It allows the directors to mortgage or pledge all of the cor-
poration's assets even though not in the usual and regular course of the
corporation's business. Obviously, since a mortgage can always be fore-
closed, this power poses a danger to minority interests. Moreover, this
power is not one which the statute expressly authorizes a corporation to
negate by a contrary charter provision requiring shareholder approval.
It is possible, therefore, that the only way to protect the shareholders
may be to require a high director vote"0 to mortgage corporate assets.
This will, of course, be no help to a minority shareholder not represented
on the board, and suggests the wisdom of adding "unless otherwise pro-
vided in the articles of incorporation ... .s8 7 to such statutory grants of
directorial power.
VII. CONCLUSION
What then should be the final evaluation of the new revision? As indi-
cated, the new revision has added only a few provisions to assist the close
(e) The preemptive right shall be only an opportunity to acquire shares or other securities
under such terms and conditions as the board of directors may fix for the purpose of pro-
viding a fair and reasonable opportunity for the exercise of such right."
84. 2 Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. § 71 (Supp. 1966). Compare the earlier provision set
forth in Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. § 71 (1960) with the provision in 2 Model Bus. Corp.
Act Ann. § 71 (Supp. 1966).
85. Model Act § 78 provides:
"The sale, lease, exchange, or other disposition of all, or substantially all, the property
and assets of a corporation in the usual and regular course of its business and the mort-
gage or pledge of any or all property and assets of a corporation whether or not in the
usual and regular course of business may be made upon such terms and conditions and for
such consideration, which may consist in whole or in part of cash or other property, in-
eluding shares, obligations or other securities of any other corporation, domestic or foreign,
as shall be authorized by its board of directors; and in any such case no authorization or
consent of the shareholders shall be required."
86. This raises the question of whether a provision under Model Act § 54 could be used
to require shareholder approval as well.
87. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 911 (1963).
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corporation. There are no new provisions for resolving disputes, and this
is disappointing.
The one subdivision designed to accommodate the need to keep the
close corporation close seems supererogatory because of its failure to
specify and expressly validate particular forms of share restrictions.
Except for the minor change in the director-consent provision, the
only change in the Model Act subserving the no-"red-tape" demand is the
authorization of the all purpose clause."' This clause is, however, suffi-
cient reason for commendation, although the simplification could have
gone further.
The most significant changes introduced by the new Act are in the area
of flexibility of power allocation. Section 34, with regard to shareholder
agreements, is not radical, since, taken alone, it merely codifies the com-
mon law rule.
Section 35, allowing the abolition of the board of directors as a man-
agement organ, and section 36, providing the corporation with the power
to choose any number of directors it desires, are, of course, significant
advances. These provisions will enable a close corporation with any num-
ber of participants to mold the control power given to each person in
terms of financial or opposing nonfinancial considerations exactly as the
participants agree. In any vote on the new Act's merits these sections
must weigh heavily in its favor.
All improvements are, of course, to be measured against deficiencies
carried over from the previous version. Each legislature must make this
evaluation for itself. It is safe to say, however, that the new Model Act
is more favorable to the close corporation than its predecessor. It is also
safe to say that it could have been more favorable.
88. See also, however, the abolition of the minimum capital requirement, old Model
Act §§ 51, 43(e).
